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Foreign Direct Investment and 
Industrial Restructuring 
The Case of Taiwan’s 
Textile Industry 
Tain-Jy Chen and Ying-Hua Ku 
11.1  Introduction 
Whether or not foreign direct investment (FDI) causes domestic indus- 
try to “hollow out” (deindustrialize) is a question that has long been de- 
bated in  the literature but that remains unanswered. The debate has fo- 
cused on the relation between FDI on the one hand and employment and 
exports on the other. Some argue that FDI creates jobs at the headquar- 
ters, which provides technical and managerial services to overseas sub- 
sidiaries (Lipsey 1995). FDI may even protect unskilled jobs at home if 
skill-intensive work like R&D is conducted abroad (Blomstrom, Fors, and 
Lipsey  1997). FDI also enables investing companies to preserve export 
market shares that would otherwise be lost to local competition or compe- 
tition from low-wage countries (Lipsey and Weiss 1984). Others argue that 
FDI is  tantamount to industry dislocation and the export of jobs from 
home (Bluestone and Harrison 1982). 
In this paper, we take a direct look at the relation between FDI and the 
domestic industrial structure. Following Mucchielli and Saucier (1 997), we 
view FDI as a Schumpeterian innovation whereby industrial production is 
reorganized across borders in  order to gain a competitive edge. Indeed, 
Schumpeter called “the conquest of a new source of supply of raw materi- 
als or half-manufactured goods” (1934,66) an innovation. Since any inno- 
vation is a “constructive destruction” process, it inevitably has some im- 
pact on the domestic industry, benefiting some firms and factories while 
hurting others. Therefore, it should not be surprising if FDI brings about 
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some redistribution in the economy. And like any successful innovation, 
successful FDI creates transitory profits for the innovators, tempting their 
competitors to follow suit until profits are completely dissipated. 
If FDI is something innovative that brings competitive advantages to 
the investors, firms that choose not to follow suit must come up with some 
counterinnovations at home or risk losing their market shares and conse- 
quently their workforce. Therefore, FDI by an individual firm is likely to 
have an extensive impact on the whole industry through innovations and 
counterinnovations. The key to understanding how FDI may affect the 
domestic industry, therefore, lies in an exploration  of the nature of the 
restructuring associated with FDI-induced innovations. 
Industrial restructuring associated with FDI may occur on three differ- 
ent levels. First, some firms may introduce new product lines to replace 
old ones transplanted  overseas. This is done in an effort to exploit the 
power of their firm-specific assets, which are often embodied in their em- 
ployees, especially in the skilled ones. Laying off workers runs the risk of 
leaking special know-how to competitors. Therefore, arrangements will 
be made to deploy workers to new production units. Usually, such a place- 
ment plan is well thought out before a foreign investment project is under- 
taken. This is the case of intrafirm restructuring. 
Second, relocated overseas production may be linked forward or back- 
ward to domestic industries (Rodriguez-Clare 1996). Through this linkage, 
overseas production may nourish downstream or upstream industries at 
home. This is intraindustry restructuring. The key to this type of restruc- 
turing is vertical integration between home and overseas production. In- 
volved in intraindustry restructuring may be intrafirm transactions or in- 
terfirm  linkages. Most  multinational firms prefer  to source  from  their 
home markets, particularly the headquarters, to reduce adjustment costs 
in overseas production. This provides the impetus for intraindustry re- 
structuring. 
Third, the resources released from the relocated industries may be chan- 
neled to new industries. This follows from the classical assertion that re- 
sources find their own way  toward full employment. When one industry 
declines, other industries take its place automatically in accord with the 
country’s  comparative  advantages.  This  is  intersectoral,  or economy- 
wide, restructuring. 
In this paper, we  study only intrafirm restructuring, using the case of 
Taiwan’s textile industry as an example. The study shows that firms that 
undertook FDI gained market share and employment share at home rela- 
tive to firms that did not. Loss of employment in Taiwan’s textile industry 
was mainly attributable to the exit of failing firms rather than to FDI. All 
firms responded to rising labor costs in Taiwan by increasing specializa- 
tion, but those engaged in FDI proceeded further. FDI firms also switched FDI and Industrial Restructuring in Taiwan’s Textile Industry  321 
their major product lines more frequently and changed overall product 
composition more extensively than their non-FDI firm counterparts. The 
evidence suggests that FDI accelerates the restructuring process, which is 
probably  inevitable under prevailing macroeconomic  conditions. Firms 
that choose to make overseas investments also choose a fast track for re- 
structuring and take high jumps over technological hurdles, while those 
choosing not to engage in  overseas production  choose a “gradual” ap- 
proach to restructuring and make only marginal changes in production 
technology. 
11.2  Foreign Direct Investment and the 
Restructuring of Taiwan’s Textile Industry 
Before 1980, the textile industry was Taiwan’s largest manufacturing in- 
dustry and largest export sector. Starting in the mid-1980s, rising wages 
made labor-intensive operations in the textile industry uncompetitive, and 
many textile firms responded by undertaking FDI in lower wage coun- 
tries. FDI set off a restructuring process that has completely reshaped the 
textile industry. Production shifted from garments to fabrics and textile 
fibers with the method of production becoming more capital intensive and 
the value added generally increasing. There has been extensive turnover 
among individual firms since FDI began, and the surviving firms have 
recomposed their product lines to cope with the new climate of competi- 
tion. This experience makes the textile industry a perfect case for the study 
of the relation between FDI and industrial restructuring. 
FDI in the textile industry started with garment firms that relocated to 
nearby Southeast Asian countries and China with the simple aim of sal- 
vaging their export markets. After a massive relocation of garment opera- 
tions, fabric manufacturers found it difficult to service overseas markets 
from Taiwan. Some decided to make FDI in the clusters of garment oper- 
ations in Southeast Asia and China in order to better serve their old cus- 
tomers or to explore new patrons in the same locations. FDI by  fabric 
manufacturers brought with it the dyeing and finishing operators that cre- 
ate the textures and colors distinctive of the Taiwanese industry. 
When the local fabric industry reached a certain level of output, spin- 
ning operators from Taiwan also started to appear. Spinning operations 
are more capital intensive than weaving and garment operations. Unlike 
FDI in weaving and garments, where a large number of  small investors 
congregated in the same locations, FDI in spinning was undertaken  by 
a small number  of relatively large firms, scattered  throughout different 
countries. Each was to serve a cluster of local weaving and garment firms. 
Finally, fiber producers from Taiwan also joined these clusters to cap 
the agglomeration process. Because fiber production is even more capital 322  Tain-Jy Chen and Ying-Hua Ku 
intensive and technologically demanding than spinning, FDI takes place 
only when the local market is large enough to guarantee economies of 
scale and competition is such that local production is more advantageous 
than export. By  1997, Taiwanese fiber producers had made three major 
investments: in Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines. 
FDI has brought  about a dramatic change in  the textile industry in 
Taiwan. Table 11.1 lists the employment and output values of three sub- 
sectors of the textile industry, namely, synthetic fibers, spinning and weav- 
ing (knitting), and garments for 1986-96.  It can be seen that total employ- 
ment in the textile industry fell from 473,662 in 1986 to 287,065 in 1996, 
a drop of 186,597 jobs, equivalent to 40 percent of the 1986 employment 
level. Most jobs were lost in the garment sector. The output value of all 
textile products increased slightly over 1986-96, but its share in manufac- 
tured output decreased from 21.6 to 12.2 percent (data not shown). If “de- 
industrialization” is defined as “the dismantling of a country’s manufac- 
turing base” (Caslin 1987,240) and if dismantling is taken to mean a rapid 
decline in output share, then Taiwan’s textile industry is a classic case of de- 
industrialization. But a closer examination reveals that structural change 
seems to characterize the trend in the industry more vividly than absolute 
or relative decline. The composition of textile output shifted dramatically 
between  1986 and  1996, with the garment sector declining as synthetic 
fibers and spinning and weaving gained. 
Overseas production was an apparent catalyst for domestic restructur- 
ing, as manifested in the pattern of exports. In 1986, garments accounted 
for 55.8 percent of Taiwan’s textile exports, shrinking to only 19.8 percent 
in  1996. Taking the place of  garments was exports of fabrics and yarn, 
whose share of total textile exports increased from 40.6 percent in 1986 to 
73.9 percent in 1996. The destination of textile exports also shifted dra- 
matically. In 1986, the US. market absorbed 36.8 percent of Taiwan’s ex- 
ports of textile products, of which garments took the lion’s share. The US. 
market share had shrunk to only 15.9 percent by 1996, as Taiwan’s exports 
were supplanted by  those from Southeast Asia and China. In turn, the 
market share of Taiwan’s exports of fabrics and yarn to this region rose 
from 23.4 percent  in  1986 to 53.8 percent  in  1996 (Chen et al.  1997, 
In the following subsections, we  will outline the restructuring process 
in each subsector of Taiwan’s textile industry, focusing on how domestic 
restructuring was brought on by FDI. The outline is based mainly on in- 
terviews given by Taiwanese firms operating in Southeast Asia. 
20 1-8). ’ 
1. Southeast Asia includes Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Singapore. 
China includes Hong Kong. Direct trade between Taiwan and China during the sample 
period was prohibited, and indirect trade between them was usually transshipped through 











































































































Sources: Employment from Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Monthly Report on  Wages and Salaries; output value from Ministry 
of Economic Affairs, Monthly Industry Report. 
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1  1.2.1  Garments 
Garment firms were the frontrunners of Taiwanese FDI. After relocat- 
ing production  lines overseas, most garment firms reduced or removed 
their domestic production capacity. In general, larger firms and those pos- 
sessing brand names in the domestic market were more capable than oth- 
ers of retaining domestic production after FDI. Taiwan continued to ex- 
port some garments, partly because export quotas in the United States, 
Canada, and Europe served to protect Taiwan’s market shares, partly be- 
cause of Taiwan’s unique production environment. A flexible production 
network cultivated over long years of experience in serving export markets 
gave Taiwan the unique capability to switch product lines swiftly and de- 
liver products promptly. Even small garment firms maintained small-scale 
production capacity in Taiwan to produce for short orders after they had 
invested abroad. Production lead time was shorter in Taiwan because of a 
well-knit network comprising suppliers and subcontractors who could di- 
vide jobs in a very efficient and flexible manner. 
If a garment firm was too small to maintain even small-scale production 
at home, it at least kept an office in Taiwan to provide logistical support 
to overseas production. Logistical support mainly consists of such market- 
ing and procurement functions as accepting orders, making samples, par- 
ticipating in trade fairs, and procuring and collecting materials in prepar- 
ation for overseas production.  Making samples, for instance, is  a very 
important part of soliciting orders. Normally, when a potential client indi- 
cates an intention to purchase a certain type of product, multiple samples 
need to be prepared quickly for the client to inspect and to choose from. 
Taiwan is  known for its superior ability to supply small-volume, large- 
variety orders. For the small-volume market, the capacity to make samples 
fast  and creatively is  essential in  the  competition  for  orders. Making 
samples entails design capability in transforming the vague ideas of clients 
into a visualization of real products, and this capability needs to be main- 
tained at the headquarters to ensure a nimble response to market demand. 
Logistical support in the procurement of parts and materials in prepara- 
tion for production is also essential to the flexibility of  overseas produc- 
tion. When an order is accepted and planned to be carried out in an over- 
seas subsidiary, parts and materials not available at the overseas location 
need to be procured and shipped there “just in time.” Note that even in 
overseas production, quick delivery constitutes a competitive edge for Tai- 
wanese subsidiaries over local firms, as both groups face the same wages. 
Any disruption in the supply of parts and materials will delay the delivery 
schedule and undermine the core competitiveness of Taiwanese subsidiar- 
ies. For example, most Southeast Asian subsidiaries of Taiwanese garment 
firms purchase fabrics from Taiwan, and procurement is conducted by 
parent firms. It is advantageous to import fabrics from Taiwan because FDI and Industrial Restructuring in Taiwan’s Textile Industry  325 
Taiwanese suppliers provide  more  variety,  accept  smaller orders,  and 
promise shorter delivery time. Only such general purpose parts as buttons 
and zippers are procured locally. Logistical support from Taiwan’s local 
networks provides linkages that allow Taiwanese suppliers to restructure 
themselves and survive despite a massive relocation of production. 
The initial production  of  overseas subsidiaries of Taiwanese garment 
firms is furnished by orders transferred from parent companies. Gradually, 
overseas subsidiaries accumulate new  assets and explore new sources of 
clients. To beat off  local competitors, logistical support from the parent 
firm and the unique resources available from Taiwan’s production  net- 
works  become their weapons. New  clients typically come from export 
markets, and original equipment manufacturer (OEM) contracts are the 
typical form of engagement. Diversification and enlargement of the cus- 
tomer base enable home and overseas operations to be horizontally inte- 
grated, whereby firm-specific know-how is shared. 
Although most Taiwanese garment firms are export oriented, domestic- 
market-oriented firms do exist, and their FDI pattern is distinctive. When 
undertaking FDI, this type of firm exploits local markets or obtains low- 
cost products through direct production for resale to Taiwan. Such firms 
usually  hold  brand  names.  Together  with  overseas  production,  they 
strengthen their marketing capability and enlarge their marketing chan- 
nels to enhance the value of  their brands. Unlike export-oriented firms, 
which emphasize cost reduction,  this type  of  firm emphasizes product 
value enhancement. Through FDI, they gain better access to local mar- 
kets, lower their production costs, and expand their global production ca- 
pacity, all of which serve to enhance the value of their brands. 
Moreover, these firms often have  an  internationalization  strategy in 
market development and labor sourcing. They are reminiscent of U.S. and 
European firms for which international subcontracting was a major strat- 
egy for reorganizing production in the 1970s and 1980s (Mytelka 1991). 
For this type of firm, the responsibilities of the headquarters are more de- 
manding and more diverse than those associated with export-oriented in- 
vestors. In addition to procurement, production allocation, design, R&D, 
and marketing coordination are all conducted at the headquarters. 
In any event, relocated garment firms maintain close links with domes- 
tic industries. They purchase a large proportion of their fabrics from Tai- 
wan, contributing to the expansion of fabric production in Taiwan. This 
linkage allows Taiwanese subsidiaries to hone a keener competitive edge 
than their local peers. 
11.2.2  Fabrics 
Weaving (knitting) firms relocated either by  following in the footsteps 
of their main customers or by  making independent moves in response to 
rising labor costs at home. The overseas products of Taiwanese weaving 326  Tain-Jy Chen and Ying-Hua Ku 
firms were usually export oriented. A few firms that aimed at local markets 
often found their main competition came from imported Taiwanese fab- 
rics. Local production gave them the advantage of market proximity, but 
imported fabrics from Taiwan had the edge in quality and product variety. 
In Taiwan, the production  of fabrics was normally  accomplished by 
weaving and dyeing firms independently, with the latter acting as a sub- 
contractor to the former. Only very large fabric firms had integrated weav- 
ing and dyeing operations. When weaving firms relocated abroad, they 
often had difficulty finding subcontractors to perform dyeing and finishing 
functions for them. Even if there was one, its technology was likely to be 
geared toward domestically consumed fabrics and unsuitable for exports. 
Local dyeing and finishing concerns were also unaccustomed to the speed 
and punctuality of  delivery required  by  export orders. For example, in 
Southeast Asia, local fabric firms were usually established with in-house 
dyeing and finishing operations. Specialized and independent dyeing and 
finishing subcontractors  were  not as common  as  in  Taiwan.  Subcon- 
tracting dyeing and finishing jobs to an integrated fabric firm ran the risk 
of products being emulated. The response of Taiwanese weaving firms to 
this problem  was to establish their own dyeing and finishing divisions, 
making overseas operations more integrated than home operations. 
Unlike overseas subsidiaries of garment firms, which procured a major- 
ity of their fabrics from Taiwan, weaving firms bought most of their yarn 
from local suppliers, many of which were Taiwanese subsidiaries. Overseas 
production of fabrics was normally differentiated from Taiwanese produc- 
tion by  quality, tilting toward low-end products. In general, locally pro- 
duced yarn  was good enough to meet low-end demand. Production of 
yarn was capital intensive, and the investment scale tended to be large. A 
few Taiwanese subsidiaries of yarn producers in Southeast Asia were able 
to take care of most of the demand from local Taiwanese weaving firms, 
with the rest supplemented from Taiwan. The close working relations be- 
tween  Taiwanese subsidiaries  of  spinning  and weaving firms  stood  in 
sharp contrast to the largely segregated operations of  weaving and gar- 
ment investors. 
Fabrics made by Taiwanese weaving firms were either directly exported 
or made into garments for export. Only a small fraction was locally con- 
sumed. Because the customer base was partly formed by  local garment 
firms, Taiwanese weaving subsidiaries were much more adapted to local 
conditions than were garment firms, which more or less operated in ex- 
port enclaves. 
Unlike garment firms, most weaving firms retained their home opera- 
tions after investing abroad. Relocation  of some low-end product lines 
prompted Taiwanese operations to move upward to higher end products. 
Horizontal differentiation of domestic and overseas production was the 
norm. Overseas production complemented domestic production in terms 
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overseas subsidiaries accepted orders independently and swapped produc- 
tion capacity when needed. To increase the degree of product differentia- 
tion, many weaving firms in Taiwan also integrated fabric design, dyeing, 
and printing operations at home. More commonly, they invested in new 
weaving and knitting machines to improve productivity. This resulted in 
increased capital intensity and overall plant modernization in  the fabric 
industry after the mid- 1980s. 
Improvements in design capability were also evident in Taiwan’s fabric 
industry. In the old days, the possession of production capacity seemed to 
be enough to attract orders from international buyers. Nowadays, Taiwan- 
ese fabric producers have to keep abreast of world fashion, to design their 
own products, and to participate actively in international fairs in order to 
attract orders. In the past, trading firms collected fashion information and 
provided samples to fabric producers to ask for an allotment of produc- 
tion capacity. Nowadays, fabric producers present their own samples, al- 
beit mimics of international fashion products, to trading firms in order to 
solicit business and sometimes bypass trading firms and appeal directly to 
international merchandisers. 
11.2.3  Yarn 
Yarn production was more capital intensive and the scale of investment 
larger than that of  apparel and fabrics. Initial investment by  Taiwanese 
yarn producers was often made by  transplanting  old-vintage machinery 
and equipment from Taiwan. New machinery and equipment made in Tai- 
wan and other advanced countries would be purchased, however,  when 
local production capacity was expanded after the initial investment. Re- 
location of  existing production capacity from Taiwan was prompted by 
rising labor costs and land value in Taiwan, which rendered some yarn 
production inefficient. A shift from cotton-based spinning to manmade- 
fiber-based fabrics also made some cotton yarn production capacity ob- 
solete in Taiwan. 
The overseas subsidiaries of Taiwanese yarn producers were mostly lo- 
cal market oriented; only a small fraction of their products were exported. 
Customers in local markets included local firms and Taiwanese subsidiar- 
ies, but local firms usually outweighed Taiwanese subsidiaries in sales. 
Product lines in overseas yarn production  were  diverse. Mixed yarns 
based on manmade fibers, such as T/C (polyester-cotton mix) and T/R 
(polyester-rayon mix), were most common. In initial operations overseas, 
manmade fibers were mostly imported from Taiwan, and cotton was im- 
ported from cotton-producing countries. Recently, some Southeast Asian 
countries have established or expanded their local production capacity of 
textile fibers by  enticing direct investment or obtaining technology trans- 
fers from multinational firms. As  a result, local Taiwanese yarn subsidi- 
aries have also started procuring textile fibers from local or regional man- 
ufacturers. Countries  with  the  capacity  to  produce  textile fibers were 328  Tain-Jy Chen and Ying-Hua Ku 
inclined to erect trade barriers to hinder imports and to induce the local- 
ization of procurement. 
FDI certainly reduced yarn production in Taiwan. Total spindles fell 
from a peak of 4.8 million to 3.3  million in  1996. Capacity utilization 
also diminished for the remaining spindles. Some capacity was dismantled 
instead of being relocated overseas. For spinning firms that maintained 
bicountry or multicountry plants, domestic production was still compara- 
ble or even larger than overseas, however, because of active investment in 
new-vintage and superior equipment. 
The restructuring of the domestic spinning industry led to a change in 
product composition. The share of cotton yarn decreased while the share 
of polyester-based yarn increased. The sharpest increase was observed in 
the production of draw textured yarn (DTY) of polyester, output of which 
increased from 335,923 metric tons in 1986 to 883,005 metric tons in 1996. 
In recent years, Taiwanese spinners have all but bought out the whole 
production capacity of the world’s two major manufacturers of DTY ma- 
chines, Barmag of Germany and Murata of Japan (Taiwan Textile Federa- 
tion 1998, l 16-1 7). The rapid increase in DTY production was made pos- 
sible by the capacity expansion of its upstream material, preoriented yarn 
(POY). Capacity expansion of POY by  fiber manufacturers was mainly 
geared toward rapidly expanding demand in China. This expansion led to 
a cost reduction in POY, which boosted the competitiveness of DTY and 
trickled down to the downstream products of polyester-based fabrics. The 
buoyant fabric industry maintained close links to the clusters of garment 
manufacturers in China and Southeast Asia, explaining the looming share 
of fabric exports in Taiwan’s textile trade. 
1 1.2.4  Fibers 
Taiwan’s FDI in manmade textile fibers took place in Thailand, Malay- 
sia, and the Philippines, each by a single company. These three Taiwanese 
subsidiaries all specialized in polyester fibers. Indonesia had the largest 
textile market in Southeast Asia, but there was no Taiwanese direct invest- 
ment in manmade fibers there. Some indigenous textile fiber firms had 
technology  cooperation  programs  with  Taiwanese manufacturers,  and 
some employed Taiwanese technicians to improve productivity and qual- 
ity. There were also joint-venture textile fiber producers using technology 
furnished by the joint venture partners, notably those from Japan. The 
significant presence of local firms and the Indonesian government’s  divest- 
iture policy, which requires foreign investors to relinquish their ownership 
over time, discouraged direct investment from Taiwan. 
The manmade fiber industry was considered strategic in most devel- 
oping countries. Tariff protection and nontariff barriers, such as licensing 
controls on imports and domestic entry, were often employed to protect 
local industries, including those in which multinational firms had invested. 
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ket. Major competition for Taiwanese subsidiaries came from Japanese 
subsidiaries. Although the Japanese subsidiaries might have had a techno- 
logical edge, in terms of product quality, Taiwanese subsidiaries resorted 
to a larger scale of production to gain cost advantage. For example, Tai- 
wan’s Tuntex in Thailand endured Japanese competition and obtained a 
market  share of roughly 40 percent in  polyester fibers in  1997, mainly 
through price competition. Taiwan’s Hualon in Malaysia has monopolized 
the local market so far, although a majority of its products are exported 
to regional markets, China and Europe. 
In spite of FDI, domestic investment in manmade fibers was vibrant. 
In 1986, Taiwan produced NT$44.2 billion worth of manmade fibers. In 
1996, the product value increased to $85.8 billion. The quantity of man- 
made fibers produced was 1.24 million metric tons in 1986 and 2.60 mil- 
lion metric tons in 1996. Most expansion was accounted for by polyester 
fibers, of which Taiwan’s production capacity was ranked first in the world 
in 1996. Expanding capacity to keep unit cost down was the main strategy 
of Taiwan’s synthetic fiber producers, unlike their Japanese counterparts, 
who pursued  product differentiation more earnestly than investment in 
capacity (Japan, Ministry of International Trade and Industry 1994). 
11.3  Microdata Analysis 
In this section, we analyze firm-level data to uncover the pattern of re- 
structuring within Taiwan’s textile industry. We draw data from the gov- 
ernment’s annual censuses of  manufacturing plants. We take 1992 as the 
initial point of observation and 1995 as the end point. The choice of  1992 
is dictated by the fact that this is the earliest survey year that provides data 
on FDI. The  1995 survey provides the most recent data available. The 
time span from 1992 to 1995, although short, is long enough to trace out 
the major restructuring path of the industry, as we will see later. 
Table 1  1.2 lists the number of firms and plants in the sample. Only firms 
that own a textile plant are included in the sample, but textiles need not 
be the company’s main business. By textiles, we  mean the manufacturing 
of  synthetic fibers, spinning and weaving (knitting), and garments. The 
census was conducted at the plant level. We consolidate plant-level data 
into firm-level statistics, on which our analysis is based. The quality of the 
1992 census is relatively poor as it contains a large number of missing 
observations  on employment  and sales.2 We  delete observations  where 
both employment and sales values are absent. In comparison, the quality 
of the 1995 census is relatively good, with only a few missing observations. 
As can be seen from table  11.2, 6,054 textile firms were observed in 
2. The census is meant to cover the population of all manufacturing plants, but inevitably, 
some plants refuse to answer census questions, provide incomplete information,  or simply 
cannot be located. These missing observations are mainly for smaller plants. 330  Tain-Jy Chen and Ying-Hua Ku 
Table 11.2  Textile Firms and Plants in the Sample 
1992  1995 
Textile  Textile 
Category  Firm  Plants”  Plants  Firm  Plants“  Plants 
FDI firms  213  279  267  173  (167)  239  (227)  228  (222) 
Non-FDI firms  5,841  6,197  6,086  4,866 (4,735)  5,339 (5,072)  5,201 (5,041) 
New entrantsb  2,272 (2,409)  2,343 (2,622)  2,295 (2,461) 
Total  6,054  6,476  6,353  7,311  7,921  7,724 
”Plants include textile plants and other plants owned by textile firms. 
bNew entrants are firms entering the textile industry in 1992-95  by establishing new plants. If entry by 
acquiring or merging with existing textile plants in 1992 is included, the numbers are shown in parenthe- 
ses. In this case, the acquired or merged plants are also deducted from the calculation of survivors, 
where the corresponding numbers of firms and plants are also shown in parentheses. 
the 1992 census. Among them 213 firms indicated that they sometimes 
undertook  FDI before  1992.3 The proportion  appears to be small, but 
those undertaking FDI are relatively large firms and are more likely to 
operate multiple plants compared to the rest of the industry. Among the 
213 firms in the FDI group, 173 survived until  1995. Meanwhile, among 
the 5,841 firms in the non-FDI group, 4,866 survived. 
Note that census data are plant-level data. Plants that changed affiliat- 
ing companies are considered to have been acquired by  or merged into 
new  companies.  In  calculating  the number  of  survivors in  1995, these 
plants are treated  as being “survived” by  the new  companies, which in 
turn, are part of the survivor group. If the “new” companies were nontex- 
tile firms in 1992 that acquired or merged with textile plants to become 
part of the textile industry in  1995, we  may wish to treat them as new 
entrants rather than surviving firms from 1992 (see Dunne, Roberts, and 
Samuelson 1988, for a similar treatment). In this case, the number of survi- 
vors decreases to 167 firms for the FDI group and 4,735 for the non-FDI 
group. This implies that out of 213 FDI firms in 1992,46 exited the mar- 
ket, whereas 1,106 out of 5,841 non-FDI firms did the same, including 
those acquired by or merged into other firms. The exit rate is 21.6 percent 
for the FDI group and 18.9 percent for the non-FDI group. 
Between  1992 and 1995, 2,272 new  firms entered the textile industry 
3.  The census asked whether the company had engaged in any FDI before the time of 
survey. The exact time of investment was not identified. The 1993 census also provided simi- 
lar data. We used the 1992 census as the basis by which to cut the sample into the FDI group 
and non-FDI group, according to which differences in performance in subsequent years were 
examined. The comparison is subject to the disturbance that some firms may have under- 
taken FDI between 1992 and 1995 but been classified in the non-FDI group. Statistics indi- 
cate that Taiwanese overseas investment peaked around 1991 and 1992 (Chen et al. 1997); 
hence the number of FDI cases occurring in 1992-95  tends to be small compared with the 
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Table 11.3  Employment by Different Groups of Firms in the Textile Industry 
Category 
Number of  Employment  Share  Employment 
per Firm  Firms  (persons)  (”/I 
1992 
FDI firms  213  41,228  12.6  193.6 
Non-FDI firms  5,841  228,459  69.8  39.1 
Unobserved or error  -  57,817  17.7  - 
Total  -  327,504  100.0  - 
1995 
FDI firms  173  38,917  13.0  225.0 
Non-FDI firms  4,886  193,953  64.6  39.7 
New entrants  2,272  59,060  19.7  26.0 
Unobserved or error  -  8,457  2.8  - 
Total  -  300,387  100.0  - 
Source: Employment from Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Monthly Report 
on Wages and Salaries. 
by establishing new plants, while 137 firms entered through merger and 
acquisition. New entrants, including the latter group, accounted for 33.0 
percent of the stock of firms in 1995. Rapid exit and entry is a characteris- 
tic of Taiwan’s industry and is an important contributor to the industry’s 
improvement in efficiency (Aw, Chen, and Roberts 1997). 
Now let us look at employment in the textile industry, shown in table 
11.3. In 1992, total employment was 327,504, of which 12.6 percent was 
provided by firms that engaged in FDI and 69.8 percent by firms that did 
not, and 17.7 percent was unaccounted for due to missing observations. 
In  1995, total employment decreased slightly to 300,389, of which  13.0 
percent was contributed by FDI firms that had survived (including plants 
that survived through merger and acquisition), 64.6 percent by non-FDI 
firms that had survived, and 19.7 percent by new entrants through estab- 
lishment of new plants, while unaccounted employment was a negligible 
2.8 percent.4 These statistics show that despite attrition through exit, the 
share of employment in the textile industry contributed by FDI firms did 
not diminish. The assertion that foreign investors export jobs can be easily 
refuted in our case. In fact, if we  look at employment provided by  each 
firm, average employment by FDI firms actually increased from 193.6  per- 
4. A textile plant may be acquired by  (or merged into) a textile or a nontextile firm. A 
textile firm that expands by acquiring existing textile plants is naturally included in the survi- 
vor group, and its corresponding employment in the newly acquired plants is counted as part 
of the contribution by  the survivor group to overall employment. It is logical to also treat 
employment by  existing plants that are merged into nontextile firms in the contribution by 
the same group. Sales of the survivor group, reported below, are treated in the same manner. 332  Tain-Jy Chen and Ying-Hua Ku 
Table 11.4  Sales by  Different Groups of Firms in the Textile Industry 
Number of  Sales  Share  Sales per Firm 
Category  Firms  (million NT$)  (“h)  (million NT$) 
1992 
FDI firms  191  54,242  10.1  275.3 
Non-FDI firms  5,124  340,255  63.5  66.4 
Unobserved or error  -  141,188  26.3  - 
Total  -  535,685  100.0  - 
1995 
FDI firms  173  86,728  15.7  501.3 
Non-FDI firms  4,886  405,989  73.3  83.1 
New entrants  2,272  76,353  13.8  33.6 
Unobserved or error  ~  -  15,535  -2.8  ~ 
Total  ~  5  5 3,5  3  5  100.0  - 
Source: Sales from Ministry of Economic Affairs, Monthly Industry Report 
sons in  1992 to 225.0 persons in 1995.5  We do not know whether major 
employment shedding had taken place before 1992, but these results at 
least indicate that FDI firms are not more susceptible to downsizing than 
non-FDI firms. On the other hand, average employment of new entrants 
(through new plants) is smaller than for any existing group of firms. 
Next, let us look at market share in terms of sales as listed in table 11.4. 
The 197 FDI firms that provided sales data had a combined market share 
in 1992 of 10.1 percent. In comparison, the non-FDI firms took 63.5 per- 
cent of the market. The market share of surviving FDI firms rose to 15.7 
percent in  1995, while that of their non-FDI counterparts rose to 73.3 
percent. Both gained at the expense of failing firms. The average sales of 
surviving  firms increased  during  the  period,  particularly  among  FDI 
firms.6  Yamawaki (1  992) reported that similarly Japanese textile and cloth- 
ing firms significantly increased in size in 1965-83  by way of restructuring 
in response to rising wages in Japan. Torre (1986, 11  7) also reported that 
size is an important factor contributing to successful adjustment to rising 
production costs by clothing firms in developed countries because it per- 
mits firms to centralize a number of production services, which then could 
be provided to various plants at significant savings. New entrants through 
new plant establishments, despite their large number, took only 13.8 per- 
5. These numbers do not include employment in nontextile industries. 
6. According to Commodity Price  Statistics Monthly in  Taiwan Area of  the Republic  of 
China (June 1998), the wholesale price index of textile products rose 14.9 percent in 1992-95 
while that of apparel and accessories rose  10.7 percent. If we  use the wholesale price index 
of textile products to deflate nominal sales value, average sales of FDI  firms rose 58.7 percent 
in real terms during the period while that of non-FDI firms rose 8.9 percent. FDI and Industrial Restructuring in Taiwan’s Textile Industry  333 
Table 11.5  Distribution of Product Lines 
~~~ 
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cent of the market in 1995. The pattern that new entrants tend to contrib- 
ute only marginally to employment and sales is also found in U.S. industry 
data. Diversification and expansion (including that through merger and 
acquisition) by  existing firms are found to be the major driving force of 
industrial growth in the U.S. industry (Dunne et al. 1988).’ 
To understand the nature of restructuring, let us first look at the distri- 
bution of product lines in the industry. Product line is defined by the seven- 
digit commodity code in Taiwan’s official commodity classification. It dis- 
tinguishes, for example, woven fabrics from knit fabrics, ladies’ wear from 
men’s wear, and further distinguishes woven fabrics made of different ma- 
terials. Table ll  .5 lists the distribution of product lines in the sample. It 
can be seen that most firms operate a single product line; only about one- 
fifth of the firms operate multiple product lines. As a whole, the average 
firm operated 1.35 textile product lines in 1992. Even if nontextile prod- 
ucts were included, the average number of product lines was merely 1.40. 
From 1992 to 1995, the average number of product lines decreased, indi- 
cating that the average firm became more specialized in this period. 
Table 11.6 confirms this trend. In this table, we  trace the product lines 
of firms that survived from 1992 to 1995. New entrants, either through 
new plant establishment or through merger and acquisition, are excluded. 
It can be seen that the number of product lines of the average FDI firm 
7. Dunne et al. (1988) reported that by  averaging across industries, new entering firms 
between two census years (five years) account for approximately 16 percent of industry out- 
put, but 40 percent of the number of firms of each census year. In their paper, new entering 
firms include new entrant firms and existing firms that diversify into the said industry. New 
entrants alone account for only about 8 percent of industry output. 334  Tain-Jy Chen and Ying-Hua Ku 
Table 11.6  Product Lines per Firm, 1992-95 
All Products  Textile Products 
Category  1992  1995  1992  1995 
FDI firms  2.01  (163)  1.89  (139)  1.82  (163)  1.69  (136) 
Non-FDI firms  1.39 (4,334)  1.20 (3,721)  1.33 (4,314)  1.18 (3,636) 
Total  1.41 (4,497)  1.23 (3,860)  1.35 (4,477)  1.20 (3,772) 
Note; Only firms that operate in both 1992 and 1995 are included in the statistics. Numbers in parenthe- 
ses are sample sizes. 
decreased from 2.01 in 1992 to 1.89 in  1995. The average non-FDI firm 
had significantly fewer product lines, but the trend was the same: decreas- 
ing from 1.39 lines in 1992 to only 1.20 lines in 1995. Fewer lines among 
the non-FDI group were largely attributable to their smaller firm size. If 
we  count the number of four-digit industries operated by  each firm, the 
average number of industries operated by each firm also decreased from 
1992 to 1995. Similar findings were reported by a study of the U.S. manu- 
facturing industry over 1963-82  (Dunne et al. 1988). 
In essence, Taiwanese textile firms chose to specialize in a few product 
lines and resorted to equipment modernization, process innovation, and 
product differentiation to create a new competitive edge under immense 
pressure from rising wages. Mytelka (1991) reported a similar pattern of 
restructuring by the Italian textile industry in an effort to weather compe- 
tition coming from East Asian producers. Ghadar, Davidson, and Feige- 
noff (1987, 76) also reported that U.S. textile and clothing firms attempted 
to increase specialization in segments where they enjoyed leadership posi- 
tions in order to combat import competition. When wages were low in 
Taiwan, textile firms took any OEM orders that could fill their idled ca- 
pacity; when wages rose and labor-intensive operations were no longer 
profitable, concentration on a few niche products was desirable because in 
order to protect their threatened competitive margin, firms had to acquire 
new resources, and resources are always limited and costly. Specialization 
allowed firms to strengthen their core competitiveness with limited re- 
sources. Gollop (1997) also reported that increased plant specialization in 
narrow product lines was a major determinant of recent US. manufactur- 
ing productivity growth. Over the 1963-87  period, decreased product het- 
erogeneity accounted for about 17 percent of productivity growth, second 
in importance only to technical change and equaling the contribution of 
scale economies. Studying large U.S. companies in the second half of the 
1980s, Lichtenberg (1992) also found that de-diversification contributed 
to productivity growth of the companies studied. 
We may use a more formal index of product line concentration (or di- 
versification), the Herfindahl index, to further verify the trend of special- FDI and Industrial Restructuring in Taiwan’s Textile Industry  335 
ization. The Herfindahl index takes into account not only the number of 
product lines but also the distribution of sales among all production lines. 
The greater the Herfindahl index, the higher the degree of product concen- 
tration or the lower the degree of diversification. We calculate the Herfin- 
dahl index for each group of firms and list the results in table 11.7. Again, 
only surviving firms are included in the calculation. This principle applies 
to all indexes to be elucidated in the rest of the paper. 
It can be seen that the Herfindahl index increases across the board be- 
tween 1992 and 1995, suggesting that all firms had to become more spe- 
cialized during this period. FDI firms are shown to be more diversified 
than non-FDI firms in general, and this pattern persisted over 1992-95. 
This may be largely attributable to the larger size of FDI firms because 
firm size has been shown to be positively correlated with degree of diversi- 
fication (Amey 1964). In 1992, the Herfindahl index (for textile products 
alone) was 0.8367 for FDI firms and 0.9284 for non-FDI firms. The in- 
dexes increased to 0.8622 and 0.9552, respectively, in 1995. 
Another “paper trail” of industrial restructuring is shifts in major prod- 
uct lines between 1992 and 1995. By major product line we mean the prod- 
uct line that accounts for the largest proportion of a company’s total sales 
revenue. A shift in major product line indicates a major change in the 
company’s business orientation. 
Table 11.8 indicates the extent of major product line shift between 1992 
and 1995. It can be seen from the table that among all textile firms, 41.1 
percent shifted major product lines in 1992-95.  This defuses our concern 
that we may be looking at a period in which industrial restructuring was 
rather dormant. Indeed, the restructuring taking place in the sample pe- 
riod was remarkable. Comparing firms engaged in FDI with those holding 
out, the FDI group underwent more extensive restructuring. Among the 
FDI group, 53.4 percent of firms switched major product lines in 1992-95, 
while among the non-FDI group, only 40.7 percent of firms did so. The 
evidence suggests that FDI is often accompanied by more thorough re- 
Table 11.7  Herfindahl Index of Product Line Concentration 
Category  1992  1995 
FDI firms 
All products  0.8225  (163)  0.8495  (139) 
Textile products  0.8367  (163)  0.8622  (136) 
All products  0.9225 (4,334)  0.9512 (3,721) 
Textile products  0.9284 (4,314)  0.9552 (3,636) 
All products  0.9184 (5,353)  0.9517 (5,144) 
Textile products  0.9241 (5,3 19)  0.9558 (4,983) 
Non-FDI firms 
All firms 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are sample sizes. 336  Tain-Jy Chen and Ying-Hua Ku 




All Firms  FDI Firms  Non-FDI Firms 
Product line shift 
Shift 








Do not shift 
Total 
1,601  (41.1) 
2,291  (58.9) 
3,892 (100) 
752  (19.3) 
3,152  (80.7) 
3,904 (100) 
297  (7.6) 
3,607  (92.4) 
3,904 (100) 
70  (53.4) 
61  (46.6) 
131 (100) 
31  (23.3) 
102  (76.7) 
133 (100) 
15  (11.3) 
118  (88.7) 
133 (100) 
1,531  (40.7) 
2,230  (59.3) 
3,761 (100) 
721  (19.1) 
3,050  (80.9) 
3,771 (100) 
282  (7.5) 
3,489  (92.5) 
3,771 (100) 
Note: Subsector shift indicates a shift between four-digit industry codes. Sector shift indi- 
cates a shift between fiber, weaving and spinning, and garment industries. Numbers in paren- 
theses are percentages of firms in category. 
structuring and that firms making overseas investment are less likely to 
avoid reorienting their businesses. 
A  similar pattern  is observed  if  we  define business orientation  in  a 
broader sense. For this, we  look at the major subsector from which the 
sample firms derived their sales. By  subsector, we  refer to the four-digit 
industry classification in accord with Taiwan’s official industrial code. Sub- 
sector refers to industries such as cotton textiles (spinning and weaving), 
polyester textiles, knit garments, and the like. 
Table 1  1.8 also indicates that the textile industry underwent extensive 
restructuring, even at the subsector level. As a whole, 19.3 percent of tex- 
tile firms switched subsector in the sample period. Again, FDI firms were 
more likely than their non-FDI counterparts to switch subsectors, such as 
from cotton textiles to polyester textiles. Nearly a quarter (23.3 percent) 
of FDI firms switched subsectors while only about one-fifth (19.1 percent) 
of non-FDI firms did so. 
If we  divide the textile industry into three main sectors, namely, fibers, 
spinning and weaving (yarn and fabrics), and garments, in accord with 
two-digit industry demarcation lines, to examine whether the shift in four- 
digit industry has crossed sectoral lines, the result remains robust. Switch- 
ing between sectors is naturally less common but is, nevertheless, signifi- 
cant. Table 11.8 shows that 7.6 percent (297 cases) of textile firms in the 
sample switched sectors in 1992-95.  Once again, firms that had invested 
abroad were more likely to switch sectors than those that had stayed home. 
Production  sector switches occurred mostly from garments to spinning FDI and Industrial Restructuring in Taiwan’s Textile Industry  337 
and weaving, and from textile to nontextile industries. In other words, 
shifts within the textile industry were mostly vertical movements toward 
upstream production. Shifts of major business from textile to nontextile 
industries occur more often in the non-FDI group (65 out of 282 cases) 
than in the FDI group (2 out of  15 cases). 
In studying the largest US. firms, Berry (1975, 74) concluded that four- 
digit interindustry activity was most conducive to corporate growth but 
that this activity is normally confined within the border of two-digit indus- 
try groups. Gorecki’s study of  British industry between  1958 and  1963 
also found that “enterprises diversified to a large extent within a group of 
industries that could be considered homogeneous in a technical sense” 
(1975, 143). Our finding is in general conformity with these conclusions, 
but cases of firms jumping industry borders seem to be more pervasive in 
Taiwanese industry. 
It is worth nothing that restructuring within the garment sector may 
be relatively difficult for Taiwanese firms. Torre (1986, 90), for example, 
reported that successful adjustments of the garment industries in devel- 
oped countries in the 1970s and 1980s entailed either “moving up the mar- 
ket” by  incorporating better product  design, higher quality, more elab- 
orate  materials  and  accessories, and  better  distribution  networks and 
consumer  services or reducing costs through  offshore  subcontracting. 
Both cost reduction and product value enhancement options are formid- 
able tasks for Taiwan’s no-brand manufacturers, who themselves serve as 
international subcontractors. In contrast, restructuring is relatively easy 
in the weaving and spinning sector because there is some room for Taiwan- 
ese  firms to make process  innovations and expand capacity. Garment 
firms that have difficulties restructuring within the garment sector may 
wish  to jump to weaving and spinning, taking advantage of knowledge 
relevant to the textile industry. 
Switching main product lines is only a crude measure of product line 
shift. It provides a discrete number (zero or one) to indicate whether there 
is a switch. Firms shifting weights between product lines without changing 
major product always get a measure of zero. We  therefore need a more 
sophisticated measure to capture shifts in product line composition. To 
this end, we  calculate the share of  each product  line in  total sales and 
measure changes in these shares between 1992 and 1995. Naturally, some 
product  lines  have  their  shares increased while  others  have  them  de- 
creased. Since the shares of all product lines sum to one, the shares gained 
by  the rising product lines always equal the shares lost by  the declining 
product lines. We therefore take the combined shares gained by the rising 
product lines as a measure of product composition change and call it the 
“composition change index.” 
The index can be understood from figure 1 1.1. In figure 1  1.1, we  spread 
product lines along the horizontal axis, assuming, for simplicity, that these 338  Tain-Jy Chen and Ying-Hua Ku 
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Fig. 11.1  Measuring changes in product composition 
product lines are continuous. The product lines manufactured in period 1, 
together with their respective shares, are depicted by  contour A,. Since 
the shares of all products sum to one, the area under A, is unity. Similarly, 
product lines manufactured in period 2 are depicted by  contour A,. For 
the ith product line, its share decreases from period 1 (S:)  to period 2 (Sf). 
For thejth product line, its share increases from period 1 (S,!) to period 2 
(S,?).  Our index measures total shares gained by product lines such as the 
jth, or the area below the period 2 contour and above the period 1 contour, 
shaded in the figure.8 
Note that the composition change index always lies between zero and 
one. If the composition of product lines does not change, the index is zero; 
if  all product lines have been replaced, the index is one. The measure ap- 
plies to single- as well as multiple-product firms. For single-product firms, 
the measure is identical to the “major product shift” index described in 
table 11.8. 
As a side measure, we  also calculate the number of product lines that 
increased their shares of sales between 1992 and 1995 as a proportion of 
the combined number of product lines in these two years. This measure is 
named the “product line change index.” In figure 11.1, for instance, the 
total number of product lines in the two periods is n, and the number of 
8. We are indebted to Chien-Fu Chou of National Taiwan University for suggesting such 
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Table 11.9  Changes in Product Line Composition 
Composition  Product Line 
Change Index  Change Index  Sample 
Category  (“/.I  (“/.I  Size 
FDI firms 
Single plant  0.4857 (0.4654)  0.3020 (0.2512)  98 
Multiple plants  0.5858 (0.3692)  0.4208 (0.2052)  31 
Total  0.5082 (0.4503)  0.3306 (0.2455)  129 
Single plants  0.3946 (0.4678)  0.2272 (0.2486)  3,093 
Multiple plants  0.5423 (0.4280)  0.3658 (0.2217)  256 
Total  0.4058 (0.4665)  0.2380 (0.2495)  3,349 
Non-FDI firms 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors of the sample. 
product lines that increased their shares is n -  n,;  hence the product line 
change index is (n -  n,)/n.  Both indexes are presented in table 11.9. 
It can be seen from table 11.9 that both indexes suggest that product 
shifting is more pervasive among firms that undertook FDI. The compo- 
sition change index is 0.5082 for FDI firms against 0.4058 for non-FDI 
firms. This indicates that over half of the sales revenue of FDI firms in 
1995 came from new production or uneven expansion of old product lines. 
The statistics also indicate that firms with multiple plants underwent more 
sweeping changes in product composition than those with a single plant. 
This is not surprising because multiple plants provide more room for ad- 
justment and restru~turing.~ 
The product line change index shows a similar pattern, that is, more 
sweeping changes taking place among FDI firms. The index shows that 
among the FDI group, 33.06 percent of product lines were either newly 
introduced or gained production share between 1992 and 1995. In com- 
parison, only 23.80 percent of the product lines of non-FDI firms fall into 
this category. From this index, we can also infer that 66.94 percent of the 
product lines of FDI firms were abandoned or lost production share in 
1992-95,  while 76.20 percent of the product lines of non-FDI firms re- 
ceived the same treatment. This suggests that more attrition and disman- 
tling of product lines took place among non-FDI firms. As FDI is usually 
accompanied by product line relocation, investing firms are likely to intro- 
duce new product lines to replace outgoing ones or to expand remaining 
product lines to fill the vacuum left by relocation. In contrast, firms that 
9. Changes in relative prices, in addition to changes in production costs, lead to restructur- 
ing in product composition. Part of change in product mix may be a natural response to 
change in relative prices without “reorganization” of the production structure or “retooling” 
of the production technology. Hence, our index needs to be interpreted as a broad measure 
of restructuring in response to both price signals and cost factors. 340  Tain-Jy Chen and Ying-Hua Ku 
stayed away  from FDI restructured themselves by  selecting a few niche 
product lines for expansion and upgrading. Our data show that 95 new 
product lines were introduced by  129 FDI firms between 1992 and 1995, 
with each firm introducing an average of 0.736 lines, while only 1,468 new 
product lines were introduced by 3,349 non-FDI firms in the same period, 
with an average of 0.438 new lines per firm. In fact, non-FDI firms tend 
to resort to capacity expansion in a few emerging product lines, whether 
they be old or new. These product lines are conducive to process innovation 
or the realization of scale economies. This can be seen from table 1  1.10. 
Table 11.10 lists the ten most rapidly growing product lines in 1992-95 
and the contributions by various groups of firms to their growth. By  “most 
rapidly growing” we  refer to the largest increases in terms of the absolute 
value of  sales. Six  of these product  lines are polyester-based products, 
whether fibers, yarn, or fabrics. Capacity expansion of non-FDI firms in 
these areas is apparent, as non-FDI firms contribute the lion’s share to the 
growth in output. In comparison, FDI firms only contributed marginally 
to growth in these segments of the industry. Even new entrants (including 
those entering through merger and acquisition) contributed more than the 
FDI group. Meanwhile, exit from these emerging industry segments is neg- 
ligible, except for cotton-polyester mix yarn. 
Among the ten top emerging product lines, three lines were in the gar- 
ment sector, where production was nonexistent in 1992. These were newly 
introduced products. FDI firms contributed significantly to growth in two 
of them. Antonelli (1995) argued that in response to rising factor costs, 
firms restructure themselves by considering the trade-off between switch- 
ing costs and innovation costs. The former refer to costs of changing tech- 
niques within a given technology set, and the latter refer to costs of chang- 
ing production  technology. A firm’s accumulated knowledge specific to 
existing production  techniques is  critical to this choice. Although  our 
study focuses on restructuring of  product  lines and ignores technology 
changes, our results seem to suggest that FDI firms have endowment ad- 
vantages in innovation costs over switching costs. The endowment advan- 
tages that reduce innovation costs for them may  be firm-specific assets 
such as organizational strength and technological capability. With these 
advantages, FDI firms are more inclined to switch product lines by adopt- 
ing new technologies than to switch production techniques within existing 
product lines. To the extent that firms with more endowment advantages 
are more inclined to make overseas investments (Caves 1971), the fact that 
FDI firms are more apt to restructure themselves may simply be a result 
of  these advantages, rather than  of  FDI actions per  se.  Even if  this is 
the case, FDI is still an important indication of the restructuring process, 
although it is not the root of restructuring. The evidence presented above 
at least illustrates the differences between domestic restructuring that is 
associated with FDI and restructuring that is not. Table 11.10  Top Ten Growth Product Lines, 1992-95  (million NT dollars) 
Contribution  Contribution  Contribution  Contribution 
Commodity  1995  1992  Increase  by FDI  by Non-FDI  by New  by Exits 
Code  Product Line  Sales  Sales  1992-95  Firms (YO)  Firms (“/o)  Entrants (“YO)  (“4 
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1342320  8,313  0  8,313  42.2  32.2  25.7  0 
78.1  14.8  1342110  6,396  0  6,396  7.1  0 
~ 
Note: The contribution of each group of firms is measured by the change in their sales as a percentage of the increase in total sales in respective product lines. 342  Tain-Jy Chen and Ying-Hua Ku 
Since some indicators seem to suggest that more extensive and sweeping 
restructuring occurred in FDI firms, it would be desirable to put all the 
indicators together and formally test whether there was indeed a difference 
associated with FDI. To do this, we perform a principal component anal- 
ysis on several indicators that we  have presented above to obtain an ag- 
gregate measure of restructuring. We  then conduct analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) to test whether there is a significant difference between FDI 
and non-FDI firms. The restructuring indicators included in the principal 
component  analysis are (1) change in  the number  of product lines,  (2) 
change in the Herfindahl index, (3)  change in the main product line, (4) 
change of subsector, (5) change of sector, (6) composition change index, 
and (7) product line change index. 
The standardized scoring coefficients resulting from the principal com- 
ponent analysis are listed in table 1  1.1 1. It can be seen that all coefficients 
are positive except for change in the number of product lines. This is be- 
Table 11.11  Tests of Difference between FDI and Non-FDI Firms 
Principal Components Analysis of Restructuring Indicators 
Scoring Coefficient 
Indicator  (standardized) 
Change in number of product lines  -0.021 71 
Change in Herfindahl index  0.02324 
Change in main product line  0.27659 
Change of subsector  0.22165 
Change of sector  0.16227 
Composition change index  0.27964 
Product line shift index  0.25641 
Analysis of Variance by  FDI 
Category  Mean Loading Score  Sample Size 
FDI firms  0.3118  124 
Non-FDI firms  -0.0119  3,261 
F-statistic  12.56 
Analysis of Variance by Size and FDI (mean loading score) 
Large  Small  Significant 
Category  Firmsa  Firms  Difference? 
FDI firms  0.2864  (90)  0.3791  (34)  No 
Non-FDI firms  0.0691 (1,100)  -0.0531  (2,161)  Yes 
Significant difference?  Yes  Yes 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are sample sizes. 
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cause the number of product lines decreased over 1992-95  and a larger 
negative value actually indicates a higher degree of change. The rest of 
the indicators are consistently positive, where larger values suggest higher 
degrees of restructuring. 
From the appropriation of scoring coefficients, each firm is given a load- 
ing score based on the principal components of these seven indicators. 
The loading score is standardized with zero mean and unit variance, and 
ANOVA can be performed to see whether there is a significant difference 
between FDI and non-FDI firms. We list the mean score for each group 
in table 11.1  1. It can be seen that the mean score is 0.31 18 for FDI firms 
and -0.0119  for non-FDI firms. The F-statistic for the null hypothesis 
that the two groups come from the same population is 12.56, indicating 
that there is a significant difference at the 1 percent level between the two 
groups of firms. Since a greater loading score indicates a higher degree of 
restructuring, the result suggests that firms that invested abroad before 
1992 underwent deeper and more extensive restructuring in 1992-95 com- 
pared to those that had not taken a similar course. 
Since FDI firms are generally larger than non-FDI firms, this difference 
in restructuring may be attributable to size rather than FDI activity. We 
therefore introduce another dimension into the ANOVA by separating the 
sample by size, in addition to FDI. Firms that employ fewer than thirty 
employees are called small firms, and the rest are called large firms. A 
four-way classification of ANOVA is also presented in table 1 1.11. It can 
be seen that there is a significant difference in terms of mean loading score 
between  the FDI and non-FDI classes whether they be large or small 
firms. Meanwhile, size makes no difference to mean leading score among 
the FDI firms. Size only matters for the non-FDI group, where large firms 
are shown to have a significantly higher loading score. This suggests that 
it is FDI, rather than firm size, that accounts for the difference in  the 
degree and extent of restructuring. 
11.4  Concluding Remarks 
We view FDI as a Schumpeterian innovation whereby an old produc- 
tion structure is dismantled in favor of a new one. Therefore, FDI is always 
accompanied by restructuring. Restructuring may take place at the firm, 
industry, or economy-wide level. In this paper, we  examine the firm-level 
restructuring of Taiwan’s textile industry between 1992 and 1995 and find 
that restructuring was indeed extensive and sweeping. We  find that the 
average textile firm reduced its number of product lines and increased its 
concentration of product line distribution as measured by the Herfindahl 
index. About half of the textile firms under our observation switched their 
main product lines in the short time span of three years. More than one- 
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Some even moved from downstream operations to upstream operations, 
such as from garments to weaving, to take advantage of new schemes in 
the international division of labor. In fact, the product mix of the whole 
textile industry has been reshuffled to an amazing degree. For an average 
textile firm, nearly half  of sales revenue comes from newly  introduced 
product lines or from disproportional expansion of existing product lines. 
When compared with textile firms that did not undertake FDI, those in- 
vesting abroad show a significantly higher degree of  restructuring by  all 
indexes. 
There is no evidence that overseas investment led investing firms to shed 
jobs from domestic operations. In fact, there is even some indication that 
FDI enables firms to increase employment at their headquarters. Most job 
losses in Taiwan’s textile industry during the sample period were attribut- 
able to the exit of firms, and there is no evidence that FDI contributed to 
exit either. Firms that undertook FDI were also likely to expand sales in 
domestic markets, casting doubt on the assertion that “FDI hollows out 
domestic industry.” 
However, this paper falls short of  uncovering intrinsic differences in 
terms of the nature of restructuring, except for product line shift. Scanty 
evidence suggests that non-FDI firms resort more often to capacity expan- 
sion and process innovation whereas FDI firms are more keen on new 
product introduction and technology change. More research in this area 
is desirable. 
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Comment  Yum K. Kwan 
This  paper  has  to do with  outward  FDI of  Taiwan’s textile industry. 
Adopting the view that FDI is a Schumpeterian innovation, Chen and Ku 
emphasize the impact of outward FDI on the domestic industrial struc- 
ture, using the textile industry as a case study. The data consist of  two 
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surveys of firms, one conducted in 1992 and the other in 1995. Firms are 
classified into two groups, FDI firms and non-FDI firms, according to 
whether they have invested abroad or not. The two groups are then com- 
pared by  a number of  characteristics, including employment and sales; 
distribution, number, and concentration of product lines; and indicators 
of restructuring such as shifts of main product line, subsector, and sector, 
among others. The comparison shows that  FDI firms undertake more 
rapid restructuring than non-FDI firms. The authors interpret this as evi- 
dence that FDI leads to restructuring and even accelerates the restructur- 
ing process. 
At first glance, what could be more natural than doing a pairwise com- 
parison of  the kind so skillfully exploited by  the authors in tables  11.2 
through 1 1.1 1, since the objective is to ascertain the effects of FDI on in- 
dustrial structure? In the jargon of experimental design, the exercise is to 
measure the “treatment effect” of FDI on industrial structure, where the 
FDI firms constitute the “treatment group” and the non-FDI firms the 
“control group.” If the firms were randomly assigned into the two groups 
(i.e., making outward FDI or not) by  some superior authority-as  in a 
textbook experimental design setting-the  authors’ approach would be 
the right way  to go. But presumably, firms do make FDI decisions pur- 
posefully  so that they  are in fact self-selecting themselves into the two 
groups. In other words, being an FDI firm or not is an endogenous vari- 
able-and  it should be taken into account as such in the analysis-rather 
than exogenous as is implicitly assumed by the authors. Ignoring data self- 
selectivity, as the authors do in this paper, unfortunately, leads to biased 
samples and usually exaggerated treatment effects. Econometric issues re- 
lated to the problem of self-selectivity have been extensively studied in the 
literature (especially in labor economics); see Maddala (1983, chap. 9) for 
a survey. 
Similarly, the issue of survival bias (another kind of sample selectivity) 
also applies here. For an existing firm, it is unlikely that the decision to 
quit or stay is independent of the decision to invest abroad. Ignoring the 
simultaneity by comparing only surviving firms, as in the paper, will again 
lead to sample selection bias. 
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Comment  Munehisa Kasuya 
An Overview 
This paper tries to analyze the effect of FDI on employment, sales, and 
restructuring of the home country industry by  using firm-level data. It 
obtains a lot of findings that are very interesting, stimulating, and useful. 
I would like to summarize these before making a few comments. 
First, Chen and Ku criticize the hypothesis that “FDI is tantamount to 
industry dislocation and the export of jobs from home” by examining the 
relation between FDI firms and shares of employment and sales. That is, 
the data on employment in  table  11.3 show that  “there is no evidence 
that overseas investment led investing firms to shed jobs from domestic 
operations.” Those data refute the assertion that foreign investments ex- 
port jobs. The data on sales in table 11.4 show that FDI firms “were also 
likely to expand sales in domestic markets.” Those data cast doubt on the 
proposition that “FDI hollows out domestic industry.” 
After the analysis of employment and sales, the paper moves to the 
topic of restructuring. The data on restructuring in tables  11.5 through 
11.11 indicate that “FDI firms show a significantly higher degree of re- 
structuring.” Based on these statistical correlation  analyses, the authors 
conclude that FDI induces restructuring. 
Comments 
Chen and Ku are trying to support the hypothesis that “FDI induces a 
higher degree of restructuring.” I think the hypothesis is theoretically plau- 
sible because firms with more choices of production factors are supposed 
to be able to reach more efficient production levels by rearranging produc- 
tion factors. What I want to comment on first is not the hypothesis but 
the methodology of the empirical analysis. 
If we want to support the hypothesis, we  should use firms that have the 
same attributes with the exception of FDI. If firms have different attri- 
butes, we should control for those different attributes. Without such con- 
trol, we might mistake the effects of those different attributes on restruc- 
turing for the effect of FDI on restructuring. This kind  of control has 
already been done in the paper. The authors control firm size effects in the 
ANOVA because “FDI firms are generally larger than non-FDI firms” 
and “the difference may be attributable to size rather than FDI activity.” 
Meanwhile, the authors suggest that FDI firms may have “endowment 
advantages.” I am confused by this statement. That is, I am afraid that the 
endowment advantages could be a variable to be controlled like firm size. 
Differences in restructuring may be attributable to endowment advantages 
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rather than FDI activity, like firm size. Of course, there are several possi- 
bilities. We could assume that FDI causes endowment advantages. Under 
this assumption, we  could conclude that FDI induces restructuring with- 
out controlling endowment advantages. However, we  could also assume 
that  there is  no causality or even assume that endowment advantages 
cause FDI. Under these assumptions, we  should control endowment ad- 
vantages. Even if we  cannot tell which possibility is correct, I do not think 
this kind of reservation would require us to reject the conclusions of the 
paper. However, it might be better for us to be more careful in deriving im- 
plications. 
My  second comment is on the data indicated in table 11.2. Based  on 
these data, the paper analyzes several characteristics of FDI firms. I am 
afraid that we  could not get information of FDI except the data for 1992. 
However, I am also afraid that we  could not reject the possibility that new 
FDI firms entered between 1992 and 1995 from among the non-FDI firms 
of  1992. If there were new FDI firms after 1992, the comparison between 
1992 and 1995 could include a kind of bias. 
My  third  comment is  on the “unaccounted  data” in  table  11.3. The 
author suggests “the share of employment contributed by  FDI firms did 
not diminish” after comparing 13.0 percent for 1995 with 12.6 percent for 
1992. However, the unaccounted data amount to 17.7 percent. I am afraid 
that the difference in shares of employment could be smaller than those 
unaccounted data. 
My next comment is on the composition change index in table 11.9. By 
using the composition change index, the authors suggest FDI firms show 
a higher degree of restructuring. I think the share data used in making the 
index include the information of price changes. However, I do not think 
price changes mean restructuring in general, although price changes can 
lead to restructuring. It would be more comfortable for us to interpret the 
index as a broad measure of restructuring. 
Last but not least, I would like to confirm again the contributions of 
this paper. Even if there are some limits in data availability, by using firm- 
level data very efficiently and intensively, this paper makes important con- 
tributions to the field of empirical analysis of  restructuring induced by 
FDI. 